The Controversy Over Religion-Based Regulations in the 2019 Elections

2018/100, 22 November 2018

On 11 November 2018, Grace Natalie, a non-Muslim Chinese who is also the Chairperson of the Indonesian Solidarity Party (PSI), declared that her party would never support shari’a-based bylaws and gospel-based bylaws. The statement, made in Serpong, Banten, during the party’s fourth anniversary, has reignited the debate surrounding religion-based regulations.

The remark was made in response to a plan of the District Manokwari, West Papua, to implement a gospel-based bylaw (Manokwari Daerah Injil) in October 2018. The plan to make Manokwari the first “gospel city” in Indonesia by proposing that bylaw was proposed by some members of the Regional House of Representatives of West Papua, such as Dedi Subrata May. This is in line with the shari’a-based bylaws model that has been issued and implemented by more than 400 provinces, regencies, and municipalities in Indonesia. One of the reasons for her opposition to religion-based regulations is “to prevent the emergence of injustice, discrimination, and all intolerant acts in this country”.

Unsurprisingly, this statement did not receive any support or endorsement from any parties (both religious and secular) or politicians. Ma’ruf Amin, the running mate of Joko Widodo in the 2019 Presidential Election and one of the staunchest proponents of the implementation of shari’a in Indonesia, clearly opposed it. Instead, he would endorse any religion-based regulations proposed and approved by people in the various provinces, districts or municipalities. In the same vein, Eva Kusuma Sundari, a member of parliament from the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDIP), tried to neutralise the controversy by classifying religion-based regulations into two categories, one that is supportive of democracy and universal values, and one that is discriminative or exclusive.

Since the PSI is one of the Jokowi-Ma’ruf supporters in the Presidential Election, Natalie’s statement can serve as additional ammunition for Jokowi’s opponents to attack him as “anti-Islam”. Therefore, Ma’ruf Amin and several Jokowi allies quickly distanced and disassociated themselves from Natalie’s statement. Her statement also seems to contradict Jokowi’s strategy to shield himself from the use of identity politics during the campaign.

Most politicians in Indonesia, using the statement of Martin van Bruinessen, have the “fear of being perceived as anti-Islam or not Islamic enough”. Therefore, they preferred to endorse religion-based regulations or just kept silent. Even the PDIP, the most secular party in Indonesia, was supportive of the implementation of shari’a-based bylaws in several districts. In van Bruinessen’s analysis, it is the lack of courage to deal with the accusation as “anti-Islam” that has become “the most important factor that has enabled the intolerant minority to become hegemonic”. In this context, the PSI and Grace Natalie posit themselves on the front line of the struggle to beat that fear.

Natalie’s statement may result in two consequences for the PSI. It can generate support and sympathy from various minority groups whose voices were currently under-represented. Although their numbers are small, this group has finally found a party that channels their aspirations and concerns, which may help the PSI pass the four percent electoral threshold.

The second possible consequence is that this statement could lead the PSI to fade from the political scene and not pass the electoral threshold. With growing conservatism and the support of religion-based regulations, Natalie’s statement can be perceived as a kind of “political suicide”. Indeed, the cost of advocating certain principles in the current political climate can be very high.

Dr Ahmad Najib Burhani is Visiting Fellow with ISEAS - Yusof Ishak Institute.

The facts and views expressed are solely that of the author/authors and do not necessarily reflect that of ISEAS - Yusof Ishak Institute.  No part of this publication may be reproduced in any form without permission.

https://www.iseas.edu.sg/medias/commentaries/item/8594-the-controversy-over-religionbased-regulations-in-the-2019-elections-by-ahmad-najib-najib-burhani?fbclid=IwAR2D9-4Z_Vruh46iEFWqs0p-3yIVIN3v3CeRXqzqvVDK6DIX8JJavJ354oo

Aksi Bela Tauhid: Manufacturing Religious Cleavages for the 2019 Presidential Election?

2018/98, 8 November 2018

With the appointment of Ma’ruf Amin as his running mate for the 2019 presidential election, Joko Widodo (Jokowi) is believed to have shielded himself from the prospect of a bitter campaign using religion. Instead the economy will become the key campaign issue. However, the recent demonstrations in several cities in Indonesia, named Aksi Bela Tauhid (Defending Tauhid [Oneness of God] Action), appear to be an effort to exploit Islam for political purposes and undermine Joko Widodo’s support base by attacking one of his main supporters, the NU (Nahdlatul Ulama).

A two-minute clip depicting members of Banser (Barisan Ansor Serba Guna), the paramilitary wing of the NU (Nahdlatul Ulama), burning a black flag bearing the Islamic declaration of faith (shahāda) during the National Santri Day (Hari Santri) in Garut, West Java, on 22 October 2018 sparked the current controversy. What was initially believed to be an act of nationalism by burning a flag associated with the HTI (Indonesian Hizbut Tahrir), a transnational movement that has been outlawed by the Joko Widodo government, is now seen as an act of defaming Islam or committing a blasphemous act. 

Previously, the Jokowi-Ma’ruf Amin camp had been attacked for promoting Islam Nusantara (Islam of the archipelago), which Ma’ruf Amin had reframed as Wasatiyyah Islam (Middle-way Islam). While the issue of Islam Nusantara did not attract many critics, the current controversy is different. Various individual Muslims and organizations, including Muhammadiyah and the MUI (Council of Indonesian Ulama), regretted the incident and demanded that Banser apologize to the Muslim community. The chairman of GP Ansor, Yaqut Cholil Qoumas, said that he would give stern warning for the members of Banser who burned the flag, but has refused to apologize for the incident since he believed that the flag represented the HTI.

This led to a series of rallies attended by thousands of people in several cities after Friday prayer on 26 October 2018 and 2 November 2018. During the rally in Sukabumi, West Java, protesters demanded the flag burners to be prosecuted and Banser to apologize to Muslim community. If Banser did not comply, they would ask the government to ban this group. During the rally in Jakarta on 2 November 2008, one of their demands was for NU to apologize for that incident and the purification of the NU from liberalism and any other deviant beliefs. The organizer of the rallies is the same as the organizer of rallies against Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (Ahok) in 2016 and 2017, namely the GNPF (National Movement to Safeguard Fatwas), which includes people such as Yusuf Martak.

Responding to the escalation and politicization of the issue, Vice President Jusuf Kalla invited leaders of mainstream Muslim organizations, such as Nahdlatul Ulama, Muhammadiyah, Al-Wasliyah, and Persatuan Islam (Union of Islam), to meet in his office on 26 October 2018. These leaders then issued a joint statement, calling on all Muslims to be united, refusing any provocations to divide them, and any efforts to pit them against each other because of this incident. The meeting was followed by similar meeting between leaders of Muhammadiyah and NU in the headquarters of Muhammadiyah in Menteng, Jakarta on 31 October 2018 which also issued a similar statement.

The issue of Islam Nusantara and the incident of the controversial flag-burning show that religion can still be politicized in the context of the presidential electoral contest. Although Jokowi has sought to shield himself from sectarian issues by appointing Ma’ruf Amin as vice-presidential candidate, he is still vulnerable to attacks based on the politicization of cleavages within the Islamic community. 

Dr Ahmad Najib Burhani is Visiting Fellow with ISEAS - Yusof Ishak Institute.

The facts and views expressed are solely that of the author/authors and do not necessarily reflect that of ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute.  No part of this publication may be reproduced in any form without permission

Burhani, Ahmad Najib. 2018. “Aksi Bela Tauhid: Manufacturing Religious Cleavages for the 2019 Presidential Election?”, ISEAS Commentary, No. 98, 8 November. 

https://www.iseas.edu.sg/medias/commentaries/item/8521-aksi-bela-tauhid-manufacturing-religious-cleavages-for-the-2019-presidential-election-by-ahmad-najib-burhani  

The hijab in Indonesia: From oppression to high fashion

By  AHMAD NAJIB BURHANI,HUI YEW-FOONG
Published  3:00 AM, SEPTEMBER 13, 2017
Updated 6:56 AM, September 18, 2017

Some observers of the dynamics of religiosity in Indonesia have argued that there has been a conservative turn in Indonesian Islam.

What is defined as Islamic conservatism is a type of religiosity closely associated with Wahhabism, Salafism or even radicalism. It is akin to bringing back dated Islamic culture and practising it in the contemporary era.

What is often neglected in understanding this kind of conservatism, which is different from other forms of conservatism, is its association with capitalism, market forces and global trends.In fact, this kind of association allows religious conservatism to manifest itself in pop-cultural forms. Adopting it does not make one feel old-fashioned; instead, it allows one to experience a sense of religious piety and being trendy at the same time.

Conservatism, packaged and marketed through global capitalist channels, is no longer shrouded in a veil of backwardness, but brandishes the face of a new modern culture. One salient example of this trend is the donning of the Islamic headscarf, commonly known as the hijab.

Previously, the hijab was seen as a symbol of oppression, an awkward outfit that constricted the freedom of women.In certain quarters of society, it was even seen as a strange practice or was taboo.

Now, the image of the hijab has taken an about-turn, as the headscarf takes centre stage in fashion shows, being displayed or exhibited as fashion accessories in five-star hotels in Jakarta and other major metropolitan cities around the world.

Thus, the hijab is getting more ubiquitous in Indonesia not just because Muslim women are getting more conservative, but because they are getting more fashionably conservative.To wear the hijab is hip, and those that wear it are known as “hijabers”.

But as we begin to see the hijab donned more commonly in public spaces in Indonesia, have Muslim women in general really taken to the headscarf, and has it really become a standard part of their attire?

A recent nationwide survey commissioned by the Iseas–Yusof Ishak Institute seems to suggest that this is indeed the case. Over 82 per cent of respondents agree that Muslim women should wear the hijab, and the proportion differs little where gender is concerned.

That is, more than 80 per cent of Muslim women think that they should wear the hijab, which means that it is not simply a practice imposed on them by Muslim men. Indeed, 78.2 per cent of the Muslim women surveyed claim to wear the hijab.

Contrary to practices during the New Order era, particularly in the 1980s when wearing the hijab in public schools was prohibited, female Muslim teachers and students are now strongly encouraged to don the hijab.

In fact, movie stars, politicians, businesswomen, police officers, military personnel and even female national athletes wear the hijab in their daily and professional lives.

Currently, the types of hijab available on the market are not only the conventional ones sporting modest designs, but are also exquisite and luxurious ones that fetch high prices. Several nationally-acclaimed designers have dabbled in creating these trendy headpieces, while fashion models, artistes and movies stars have taken part in marketing these fashionable headscarves through various outlets, both online and offline.

Some of them are religiously motivated, while others, including non-Muslims, are motivated by profit. Whatever the motivation, the business of the hijab in Indonesia is big business, and the religious market is one that cannot be ignored.

Another interesting finding from the survey is related to the income and education of hijabers.In contrast with common assumptions concerning those who wear the hijab, the survey shows that almost 95 per cent of Muslim women with a high education wear the hijab, compared with less than 80 per cent for those with medium or low education.

At the same time, the survey shows that the higher the income level of the Muslim women, the more likely they are to wear the hijab.In short, the trend seems to be that Muslim women of higher socio-economic status are more likely to be wearing the Islamic headscarf as part of their regular attire.This result also underlines the transformation of the meaning of the hijab and religious piety.Being religious, as expressed through donning the hijab, is no longer seen as hindering the education and career of Muslim women.

Instead, for some Muslim women, the hijab is even perceived as a symbol for educated women and professional success.Thus, the fact of the matter is that the hijab is not merely a sign of conservative Islam imposed by Muslim men on less educated and low-income Muslim women.On the contrary, the hijab may be seen as trendy and the in-thing to wear, and a sign of independence for Muslim women in Indonesia.

ABOUT THE AUTHORS:
Ahmad Najib Burhani and Hui Yew-Foong are, respectively, Visiting Fellow and Senior Fellow at ISEAS Yusof Ishak Institute.

http://www.todayonline.com/commentary/hijab-indonesia-oppression-high-fashion